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Abstract. Event-B has been actively used within the EU Deploy project
to model dependable systems from various application domains. As a re-
sult, we have created a number of formal approaches to explicitly reason
about dependability in the refinement process. In this paper we overview
the work on formal engineering of dependable systems carried out in the
Deploy project. We outline our approaches to integrating safety analysis
into the development process, modelling fault tolerant systems and prob-
abilistic dependability evaluation. We discuss achievements and chal-
lenges in development of dependable systems within the Event-B frame-
work.
Keywords: Formal modelling, dependability, safety, fault tolerance, Event-
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1 Introduction
Nowadays we tend to place increasing reliance on computer-based systems and
software which they are running. The degree of reliance that we can justifiably
place on a system is expressed by the notion of dependability [1]. However, the
analysis of recent software-caused accidents has shown that the current devel-
opment process is inadequate for achieving high degree of dependability. While
a number of existing methods and tools address certain aspects of dependable
systems development, there is still a lack of a general viable dependability-explicit
techniques for developing software for complex systems.
To address this issue, in the FP7 EU Deploy project [2] we have proposed a
number of approaches that allow the designers to explicitly address dependabil-
ity throughout the entire system development by refinement in Event-B [3]. In
this paper we briefly overview the approaches that have been mainly proposed
by the researchers from A˚bo Akademi University. The goal of this paper is to
present some evidences that Event-B consitutes a suitable framework for formal
dependability-explicit development.
2 Engineering Dependable Systems with Event-B
2.1 Event-B
Currently, complexity is perceived as the main threat to dependability. To cope
with the system complexity, we need scalable formal techniques to explicitly
address various dependability aspects throughout the entire development cycle.
It is widely recognised that system complexity can be managed via abstract
modelling, decomposition and iterative development. Event-B [3] is a formal
top-down development approach to correct-by-construction system development.
Development in Event-B starts from defining a high-level specification that rep-
resents the system behavior and properties in a highly abstract way. The main
development technique – refinement – allows us to ensure that a concrete specifi-
cation preserves the globally observable behaviour and properties of the abstract
specification, i.e., verify correctness with respect to the abstract specification.
Verification of each refinement step is done by proofs. The Rodin platform [4]
automates modelling and verification in Event-B.
2.2 Dependability in System Development
The notion of dependability encompasses a wide range of system properties.
Traditionally, dependability can by characterised by such attributes [1] as reli-
ability, safety, availability, maintainability, confidentiality and integrity. In the
Deploy project, the main focus has been on developing techniques addressing
safety, reliability and availability.
The system dependability is impaired by failures, errors and faults [1]. To
break the chain of propagation of a fault – a physical defect or malfunction of a
system component – towards the system boundary, the system designers employ
a variety of techniques to avoid and remove faults, as well as tolerate and forecast
them. Let us now discuss the ways in which Event-B facilitates development of
dependable systems.
The main purpose of fault prevention (or fault avoidance) techniques is to
avoid occurrence or introduction of faults during the development process. De-
velopment in Event-B allows the designers to better understand the system re-
quirements and properties and express them in precise mathematical way. The
verification that proceeds hand-in-hand with the modelling enables early identi-
fication of design errors and avoid dependability-impairing failures.
Fault tolerance methods are used to design a system in such a way that it
is capable of functioning despite the presence of faults. While specifying fault
tolerant systems in Event-B, we model not only nominal system behaviour but
also failure occurrence and fault tolerance as an intrinsic part of the system
specification. It allows us to formally underpin fault assumptions and rigorously
define fault tolerance mechanisms.
Fault removal is a set of techniques for identifying and removing the causes
of errors. The fault removal process at the development stage starts with system
verification, which is followed by diagnosis and correction steps. While mod-
elling systems in Event-B, we rely on proofs, probabilistic extension of Event-B
and associated probabilistic model checking to verify correctness of functional
behaviour and satisfaction of the desired dependability attributes.
Fault forecasting aims at evaluation of the impact of fault occurrence and ac-
tivation on the system behaviour. Such an evaluation has qualitative and quan-
titative aspects. The qualitative analysis helps to designate and classify failure
modes as well as identify combinations of faults of components that may po-
tentially lead to a system failure. We have demonstrated that how a seamless
integration between Event-B and various techniques for safety analysis facilitate
qualitative assessment of the impact of faults on the system dependability. The
probabilistic extension of Event-B allows for the quantitative assessment of to
what extent certain attributes of dependability are satisfied.
Therefore, we believe that Event-B constitutes a suitable and versatile frame-
work for creating a rigorous dependability-explicit development process. Next we
overview in a more details our contributions to attaining establishing dependability-
explicit development process with Event-B.
3 Formal development of fault tolerant mode-rich
systems
A widely used mechanism for achieving fault tolerance is based on the notion of
modes. In our work [10,11,12], we have proposed an approach to formal develop-
ment of fault tolerant mode-rich systems. Such systems achieve fault tolerance
by rollbacking to specific degraded modes. The proposed formal development
process allows the designers to develop a system in a layered fashion. Essen-
tially, it consists of a number of steps gradually unfolding system architectural
layers by refinement. Moreover, we prove the consistency between mode transi-
tions on adjacent architectural layers, which significantly improves scalability of
verification. It has been noted that testing and model checking of the systems
with complex mode transition schemes suffers from poor scalability. We have
overcame this problem by relying on incremental verification of global mode
consistency properties by proof and hence achieved a good scalability.
In our approach to modelling mode-rich systems [10,11,12], we have focused
on verification of consistency of a predefined mode logic. In [13], we have pro-
posed to conduct Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) of each opera-
tional mode to identify mode transitions required to implement fault tolerance.
Fault tolerance is achieved by two different means – transitions to a more de-
graded mode and dynamic reconfiguration using redundant components. Fur-
thermore, we have investigated a complex interplay between the states of com-
ponents during reconfiguration and the system modes.
4 Goal-oriented refinement of reconfigurable systems
In [5,6,17], we have investigated the problem of ensuring safety and fault toler-
ance of mobile agent systems. The work has resulted in defining the modelling
patterns to represent agent roles in dynamic scopes and deriving the logical
conditions to ensure system dependability.
In [7], we have continued our study of multi-agent systems and have proposed
a goal-oriented approach to development of multi-agent systems. It is currently
recognized that the goal-oriented development facilitates design of complex dy-
namically adaptable systems. In goal-oriented development the system require-
ments are defined in terms of goals – the functional and non-functional objectives
that a system should achieve. Often changes in system operational environment,
e.g., caused by failures of agents – independent system components of various
types – might hinder achieving the desired goals. In [ADA] we have proposed a
formal development approach that ensures goal reachability ”by construction”.
Essentially, our approach allows the developers to define system goals at differ-
ent levels of abstraction and guarantee goal reachability despite agent failures.
We have derived refinement patterns modelling the mechanisms for dynamic
system reconfiguration by reallocating goals from failed agents to healthy ones
and, per se, guarantee dependability. We believe that our approach offers a scal-
able technique for formal development of dynamically reconfigurable dependable
systems.
While refining a reconfigurable system, we had to assume that sufficient
amount of agents would remain operational to achieve the desired goals. In [8],
we have demonstrated how to integrate probabilistic analysis to quantitatively
assess the likelihood of goal reachability despite failures. The rigorous refinement
process has allowed us to establish the precise relationships between component
failures and goal reachability. We have assessed the derived reconfigurable sys-
tem architecture to quantitatively verify that it achieves the desired reliability
and performance objectives. This was accomplished by relying on the probabilis-
tic extension of Event-B to verify reliability and performance properties using
PRISM model checker [9].
5 Integrating Safety Analysis into Formal Development
In [14], we have demonstrated how to combine formal modelling and refinement
with Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). We have defined a set of pat-
terns formalising the requirements derived from FMEA as well as automated
their integration into the formal specification. The proposed approach facilitates
formal development and improves traceability of safety requirements. The ap-
proach proposed in this paper allows us to automate the formal development
process via two main steps: choice of suitable patterns that generically define
FMEA result, and instantiation of chosen patterns with model-specific infor-
mation. Our approach allows the developers to verify (by proofs) that safety
invariants are preserved in spite of identified component failure modes. Hence
we believe that it provides a useful support for formal development and improves
traceability of safety requirements.
The use of an evidence generated from formal analysis is still an open issue
in the system certification process. Sometimes the formal proofs deemed to be
too complex and cause doubts regarding their trustworthiness as the evidence in
safety cases of safety-critical systems. Another open issue related to the formal
modelling process is whether the obtained formal model adequately represents
safety requirements described in a system specification. In our work[18] we pro-
posed an approach to linking formal modelling in Event-B with safety cases.
We give the classification of safety requirements and define how each class can
be represented in a formal specification. The approach allows the developers to
obtain a consistent system specification that facilitate deriving a sufficient safety
case.
The systems, whose components are susceptible to various kinds of faults,
never are ”absolutely” safe, i.e., certain combinations of failures may lead to
an occurrence of a hazard – a potentially dangerous situation breaching safety
requirements. To demonstrate that the probability of a hazard occurrence is ac-
ceptably low, in [15] we have presented a formal approach to integrating quanti-
tative safety analysis into formal system development by refinement in Event-B.
Essentially, our approach can be seen as a process of extracting a fault tree –
a logical representation of a hazardous situation in terms of the primitives used
at different abstraction layers. Eventually, we arrive at the representation of a
hazard in terms of the failures of basic system components, which allows us to
calculate probability of a hazard occurrence. The proposed approach is based
on a probabilistic extension of Event-B [16]. It enables development of systems
that are not only correct but also safe by construction.
6 Quantitative Assessment of Dependability
To facilitate dependability-explicit development in the probabilistic Event-B [16],
we strengthened the notion of Event-B refinement by requiring that a refined
model, besides being a proper functional refinement of its more abstract counter-
part, also satisfies a number of quantitative constraints. These constraints ensure
that the refined model improves (or at least preserves) the current probabilis-
tic measures of system dependability attributes. In our work, these additional
constraints are usually derived from the fundamental properties of Markov pro-
cesses. To validate the proposed approaches, in Deploy we have conducted a
number of case studies including formal development and quantitative assess-
ment of a fault tolerant satellite system, formal modelling integrated with safety
analysis of a radio-based railway crossing controller, service-oriented system etc.
This work allows the designers to to evaluate the impact of the chosen design
decisions on system dependability.
7 Discussion
Our work on formal engineering of dependable systems in the EU Deploy project
has resulted in two types of approaches:
– the approaches that focus on creating modelling patterns and guidelines for
representing and verifying certain resilience-related behavior
– the approaches that integrate (external) techniques for safety and reliability
analysis into the formal development process of Event-B.
A tight cooperation with the Deploy industrial partners has allowed us to gain
rich experience in modelling dependable systems from the transportation, aerospace
and business information system domains. The development of industrial-scale
systems has emphasized the need for scalability in formal modelling and au-
tomatic tool support. It has fostered the research on modularisation and de-
composition techniques for Event-B as well as development of various plug-ins.
Moreover, it has led to understanding importance of heterogenous modelling
techniques to address a variety of dependability aspects.
In general, we believe that Event-B offers a powerful formal technique for
engineering dependable systems. To leverage scalability and industrial relevance
of the method, we will continue to enlarge the set of modelling patterns for rep-
resenting various dependability aspects, strengthening automatic tool support
and enriching its capabilities via dedicated plug-ins to the Rodin platform.
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